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Introduction
Ad valorem taxes on real property are an important revenue source for local governments
throughout the United States. Additionally, they are often a signiﬁcant expense for the
property owner. Controversy rages fairly constantly both within the academic
community and amongst the general public about property tax issues such as the level of
property taxes, assessment and related valuation issues, progressivity or regressivity
questions, and the topic of this study, vertical equity.
Vertical equity is the concept that all properties are proportionately assessed according
to their value. That is, the assessed value on a $500,000 property would be four times that
of a $125,000 property if assessments fairly reﬂected the incremental value. The assessed
value/market value ratio (AV/MV) is a common tool used in vertical equity studies.
Vertical equity amongst all properties on a tax roll would be realized if all of the
properties had similar AV/MV ratios. Vertical inequity will be the result if assessments are
not a constant proportion of market value across all value categories. Regressive vertical
inequity occurs if higher-priced properties are underassessed as compared to the lower-
priced properties. That is, a tendency for AV/MV ratios to be lower for higher-end
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Abstract. Vertical equity in ad valorem real property taxation is the concept that all
properties within a taxing jurisdiction are assessed in equal proportion to their fair market
value. This study examines the assessment of single-family homes in Bellingham,
Washington, utilizing a database of 1,118 home sales in the southern half of Bellingham
that sold during the time period January 1990 through June 1994. The results of several
empirical tests suggest the presence of regressive vertical inequity. It appears that higher
market value homes are assessed at a lower proportion of their value (sales price) than less
expensive homes. These results suggest that property taxation at the local level magniﬁes
the regressivity of Washington State’s already highly regressive state tax system. Why does
this apparent regressive vertical inequity exist? The authors offer several possibilities
including the propensity of wealthy homeowners to challenge property tax assessments, the
difﬁculty of valuing the amenities inside an upper-end home, the heterogeneity of the upper-
end home market coupled with a small number of transactions, and the lack of ample staff
and other resources at the County Assessor’s ofﬁce.properties would suggest regressive vertical inequity. Progressive vertical inequity occurs
if higher-priced properties are overassessed in comparison to lower-valued properties.
Evidence of this would be higher AV/MV ratios for more valuable properties.
Vertical equity appears to be a topic more of interest to real estate scholars and
practicing professionals than to the general public. Most political controversies dealing
with property taxes relate to property tax rates and reassessment issues. In many states,
voter concerns over property taxes have resulted in the passage of initiatives to limit or to
lessen property taxes. In California, Proposition 13, passed in 1978, limits both the
maximum property tax rate and the reassessment process. Florida’s Save Our Homes
initiative, passed in 1992, limits assessed value increases for owner-occupied homes.
Michigan’s recently passed tax reform changed the primary source of public school
ﬁnance from property taxes to a higher sales tax. While most voter initiatives deal with
reassessment and/or taxation-level issues, evidence of persistent regressive vertical
inequity could heighten the concerns of the public over assessment issues.
Most states mandate vertical equity by state law or constitution. In Washington State,
for example, state law requires that county assessors must assess all properties for
property tax purposes at one hundred percent of market value. Veriﬁcation of vertical
equity is often the function of a state agency designated to assure compliance by county
assessors. The most common state analytical technique is the ratio study, where recent
property sales prices are compared to their assessed values. Where state ofﬁcials ﬁnd
evidence of their overall underassessment of properties, i.e., a lower mean AV/MV ratio
than statutorily speciﬁed, or of vertical inequity, the offending county assessor could be
required to adjust his/her assessments to conform to legal requirements.
In Washington State the Department of Revenue is responsible for assuring that all
counties adhere to the requirement that properties are assessed at 100% of value. If it
ﬁnds that properties are signiﬁcantly underassessed it will work with the offending
county to get it to bring up the assessments. Only once in the last twenty years has a
county been taken to court by the State over an assessment issue. The Department of
Revenue focuses on compliance with the overall assessment ratio for each county as a
whole, rather than vertical equity within a county. About one-half of the counties in the
state reassess one-quarter of their properties each year. This meets the State requirement
that properties be reassessed at a minimum of every four years. Some counties reassess
properties every other year. Others do a statistical reassessment each year and a physical
inspection every six years.1
This study examines vertical equity in the taxation of single-family homes in
Bellingham, Washington. Property taxes are an important component of local govern-
ment ﬁnance in Washington State, particularly of public schools, cities and counties; and
property taxes are a noticeable tax burden for homeowners. In Bellingham in 1997 the
property tax levy was 1.235% of assessed valuation. Of the taxes collected 61.1% was for
schools, 20.8% was for the city, 12.5% for Whatcom County, 3.3% for the Port of
Bellingham, 1.8% for ﬂood control, and .5% for ‘‘other’’.
Prior to 1995 there are no exemptions from property tax for low-valued homes or other
such low-income property tax relief in Washington.2 Many other states provide some
relief on low-valued homes. In Florida, for example, the ﬁrst $25,000 of value of an
owner-occupied residence is exempt from property taxes. Washington’s lack of low-
income property tax relief, plus the state’s relatively high sales tax, appears to create a
fairly regressive tax regime. Washington has no personal income tax and it has been
216 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
VOLUME 14, NUMBER 3, 1997identiﬁed as having one of the most regressive tax systems in the U.S. Given the overall
nature of Washington’s tax structure, evidence of additional regressivity in the form of
regressive vertical inequity of property taxes would suggest that Washington’s overall tax
structure is even more regressive than previously believed.
The Bellingham residential property market has had signiﬁcant price appreciation over
the past ten years with a typical single-family home climbing in value from approximately
$60,000 to over $140,000, a pace of price appreciation well in excess of inﬂation. Assessed
values have risen as well, as the County Assessor increased those values to comply with
state law. The Assessor follows a four-year reassessment cycle, that is, assessed values are
adjusted every four years (one-quarter of the county is reassessed yearly). There have
been large reassessments following the large increases in market prices. This study
examines vertical equity in Bellingham, Washington, by comparing assessed values and
market sales prices for a large number of recent home sales.
The academic controversy on vertical equity tends to center around methodological
issues. Several recent articles suggest what the authors of those studies believe are the
correct and incorrect ways to measure vertical equity. This study employs several of these
suggested methodologies to examine vertical equity in Bellingham, utilizing a large
database of recent home sales provided by the County Assessor. To the casual observer it
appears that some regressive vertical inequity exists in Bellingham because several
relatively expensive homes are valued for property tax purposes at lower AV/MV ratios
than less expensive Bellingham residences. This study examines this using several
statistical methodologies that have been developed. The results of the analysis suggest
heightened regressivity in Washington’s tax system.
Literature Review
The academic literature concerning vertical equity centers upon methodological issues of
measurement. Incidence of vertical inequity has never been fully resolved because the
different methodologies yield mixed conclusions. An overview of the research and
various methodologies is contained in Sirmans, Diskin and Friday (1995). That study not
only is a thorough review of the vertical equity literature but also contains extensive
analysis that utilizes many of the conﬂicting methodologies. Utilizing a database of 1,508
owner-occupied home sales in Dade County (Miami), Florida, in 1991, the authors draw
no ﬁrm conclusions regarding vertical inequity. An examination of the data scatter
diagrams and the empirical results indicates that evidence of vertical inequity is a
function of which methodology is employed in the analysis. There does not appear to be
glaring evidence of vertical inequity although several regression results are statistically
signiﬁcant.
An earlier noteworthy work on the topic of vertical inequity is Paglin and Fogarty
(1972). They assert that the best way to examine vertical inequity is to study the assessed
value/selling price relationship. They suggest that selling price is a reasonable proxy for
market value. Their model makes selling price the independent variable and assessed
value the dependent variable. Their results suggest regressive vertical inequity.
Cheng (1974) developed a model similar to Paglin and Fogarty except that a log-linear
form is used to express the variables. Bell (1984) uses a quadratic equation to model the
relationship between assessed value and sales price. Both researchers posit that assessed
value is a function of market value as observed in actual transactions prices.
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controversy by concluding that assessment practices there were inconsistent and unfair.
The latter was asserted because it appeared that many low-priced homes were signiﬁc-
antly overassessed. That study’s simple methodology utilized assessed value/sales price
ratios and averages to reach those conclusions.
The International Association of Assessing Ofﬁcers (IAAO), the professional organiz-
ation of property tax assessors, in a 1978 work, argues that sales price (SP) is a reasonable
predictor of market value. It recommends utilizing recent sales prices to determine an
appropriate assessed value. It examines AV/SP ratios as a function of sales prices in its
study.
Kochin and Parks (1982) reverse Paglin and Fogarty’s equation in a study of King
County (Seattle), Washington. They argue that assessed value is a better predictor of
market value than sales price. They feel that errors that may arise in the assessment
process are less than errors that arise through free-market transactions. The Kochin and
Parks argument is not intuitively obvious for it appears that they are asserting that
government ofﬁcials are better able to determine market value than market forces
themselves. They argue that their tests show no regressive vertical inequity in data that,
when subjected to the traditional test, would show regressive inequity due to the
assessment process.
Sunderman, Birch, Cannady, and Hamilton (1990) utilize a spline regression model to
test for vertical inequity in the Chicago area. This interesting methodology yielded
different results than tests using older methods of analysis. The study is limited by its
small database, only forty-three condominium sales in 1984. The spline regression
methodology produces results that suggest vertical inequity while the other, older
methodologies often do not. The authors suggest that the spline regression technique is
the methodological breakthrough that is needed to measure vertical inequity.
Clapp (1990) develops a complex simultaneous equation model. He uses an
instrumental variable, Z, that is highly correlated with market value yet is uncorrelated
with the error term of the Kochin and Parks model. Clapp claims that the Kochin and
Parks model is biased towards progressive vertical inequity and that his more complex
model eliminates this bias. Sirmans et al. (1995) indicate that the Clapp model may be a
superior measure of vertical inequity.
It is apparent that no general agreement exists on the most appropriate methodology
to utilize when studying vertical equity. Additionally, there does not appear to be strong
evidence that vertical inequity is a widespread problem in the United States. However,
given the endless methodological debate and the very small number of actual properties
studied, there really is not any evidence that vertical inequity does not exist, either. The
topic appears to be one requiring further inquiry assuming that methodological issues
can at least reach the truce stage. In section four of this paper, vertical equity in
Bellingham is examined utilizing several of the methodologies reviewed above. The
equations of those models are discussed in that section.
The Bellingham Market and the Reassessment Process
The Bellingham Market
The Bellingham residential property market has been discussed in detail by Benson,
Hansen, Schwartz, and Smersh (1998), (BHSS). The following is an overview of that
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family home price appreciation since 1986, as can be seen in Exhibit 1. The most dramatic
increases occurred in 1989 and 1990. Between 1987 and 1994, the average house price
more than doubled from approximately $65,000 to over $140,000. Prior to 1987, the
residential property market had been relatively stagnant for some time, due to high
mortgage interest rates and to a fairly slow local economy in Bellingham. The rate of
appreciation from 1987–94 appears to have been caused by several factors. These include
population in-migration, signiﬁcant job creation (particularly in the retail sector), and a
limited supply of buildable lots. The latter accounted for a signiﬁcant portion of overall
home price appreciation, as the typical basic, no-view, limited amenity house lot increased
in value from around $8,000 to $10,000 in 1987 to approximately $40,000 in 1994.
Additionally, Bellingham’s upper-end home market has experienced an unprecedented
increase in sales and new home building activity since the late 1980s. Propelled in part by
purchases by non-local buyers, the size and the quantity of luxury homes in Bellingham
have increased dramatically. Some of the upscale construction is in areas where ocean
views are available from homes. Overall, the single-family home market in Bellingham
has changed since 1986, reﬂecting the changing demographics of the community. Just as
the blue collar taverns (such as the now defunct Flame Tavern), once a ﬁxture in many
Bellingham neighborhoods, have been replaced by upscale coffeehouses and sports bars,
the overall home market has been upgraded to reﬂect the inﬂux of buying power from
outside the community as well as the creation of many new employment opportunities
within the area. Given Bellingham’s location between Seattle and Vancouver, B.C., it is
not surprising that the area has been transformed into a more upscale community in the
last ten to ﬁfteen years.
The Reassessment Process
The assessment of property for tax purposes is the responsibility of the Whatcom County
Assessor, a non-partisan elected position. The County Assessor’s term of ofﬁce is four
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Exhibit 1
Whatcom County Single-Family Home Sales, 1984–1994
No. Avg. Total Transact. Price per
Year of Sales Sales Price Volume (millions) Sq. Ft
1984 1,264 $63,068 $80 $49
1985 1,769 $59,940 $106 $46
1986 1,833 $62,183 $114 $46
1987 1,954 $65,081 $127 $49
1988 2,663 $70,201 $187 $51
1989 3,173 $82,347 $261 $60
1990 2,683 $109,351 $293 $85
1991 2,431 $116,353 $283 $86
1992 2,733 $124,788 $341 $91
1993 2,623 $132,104 $347 $95
1994 2,455 $140,008 $344 $93
Source: Whatcom County Real Estate Research Reports, 1984–1994years. As stated earlier, Washington State law requires that property be periodically
reassessed to reﬂect the legal requirement that assessed values equal one hundred percent
of market value.3 In practice, most recently sold properties, when they are reassessed,
have an assessed value-to-selling price ratio of about 85% to 90%. This ratio of assessed
value to actual selling price may be inﬂuenced by such factors as the costs of sale, the type
of ﬁnancing used, and personal property included in the sale. (Also, the County Assessor
may seek to avoid masses of appeals after a reassessment by pursuing a goal of slight
underassessment.) The County Assessor reassesses one-quarter of the county each year.
This is accomplished by splitting the City of Bellingham in half and the balance of
Whatcom County in half, with each of those quarters being reassessed every four years.
Given the high rates of home price appreciation in 1987–94, many Bellingham
homeowners were confronted with large increases in assessments in 1992 and 1993. And,
because the four-year cycle prevents yearly, more gradual reassessments, it was not
uncommon for the 1992 and 1993 assessments to be ﬁfty to 100% higher than previous
assessments that were made during the 1988 and 1989 revaluation cycle. This often
resulted in large property tax increases as local taxing authorities did not lower tax rates
to reﬂect the higher values on the tax rolls.
Washington law requires that all home sales be reported to the county authorities at
the actual transaction price and various transfer taxes are imposed on each sale
according to value. The County Assessor’s ofﬁce has access to all information regarding
the sales of property within the county because, in theory, the property transfer process
in Washington State is totally transparent—that is, all terms and the full sales price of all
transactions are supposed to be fully disclosed. There are, of course, situations where a
property transfer is not at full market value such as a sale between relatives. In this
instance, the County Assessor’s staff attempts to note that this is not an arm’s-length
transaction. The County Assessor’s ofﬁce has a fairly extensive database of recent
property sales prices and, additionally, the staff does some physical inspections of
properties as part of the reassessment process. The County Assessor’s data are the basic
database of this study. That data include many hedonic characteristics of each home such
as number of bedrooms and of baths, square footage, type of heating, garage size or lack
thereof, and many other items. The Assessor’s database does not include the view of the
home, a characteristic that BHSS (1998) found to be a very important value determinant
for many homes in Bellingham.
As previously mentioned, the single-family home market in Bellingham was
transformed from 1980 to 1995 into a more upscale market with many new, large homes
coming on the market. The County Assessor’s ofﬁce has been required to reassess more
homes each year as Bellingham’s housing stock has grown and to reassess more upscale
properties than in previous cycles. Additionally, property values soared from 1987 to 1994
at much higher rates than in the years preceding that period. This changing marketplace
has posed many challenges to the Whatcom County Assessor’s ofﬁce. A staff, used to
dealing with a fairly stagnant home market, is suddenly faced with rapidly rising house
prices. Additionally, the market mix changed very quickly as more large, deluxe ocean
view homes were built. Additionally, the sheer volume of reassessments rose because more
homes exist in Whatcom County, the result of a building boom that began in 1987. All
these factors presented the Assessor’s ofﬁce with a daunting task when it began
reassessments during the early 1990s. Complicating this problem is the lack of additional
staff or other signiﬁcant assistance as Whatcom County did not signiﬁcantly increase
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reassessment task that involved a dramatically changing market environment with very
limited resources. This ‘‘lack of sufﬁcient resources’’ problem is a possible cause of the
regressive vertical inequity suggested in the analysis section of this study.
The analysis of this study is an examination of assessed values versus sales prices. It
appears as if the assessment process has led to some regressive vertical inequity due to
upper-end homes being assessed at signiﬁcantly lower AV/MV ratios than midrange or
lower-priced homes. From the data available it is not possible to empirically determine
the cause of the underassessment of relatively expensive homes. The authors can only
speculate as to the possible causes. The factors could include the difﬁculty of assessing
high-value homes, especially in a rapidly changing market environment; the lack of
resources devoted to the assessment process, leading to the inability to do detailed
inspections (therefore, missing many amenities included in high-end homes); the use of a
valuation model that omits hedonic factors that are important in determining the value
of high-end homes; and/or the attempt by assessment ofﬁcials to avoid challenges to
assessments from the high-end homeowners. The actual causes of the vertical inequity are
unknown, and this study merely reports its existence. To the extent that any measurable
vertical inequity is due to the lack of funding of the assessment activity and given the tax
dollars that could be gained by a more equitable valuation of many expensive homes, any
decision by the county political powers to underfund the County Assessor’s ofﬁce would
seem very shortsighted and foolish.
Data and Analysis
The database for this study is comprised of 1,118 home sales in the southern half of
Bellingham from January 1990 through June 1994. Data were supplied by the Whatcom
County Assessor and include the reported sales price, sales date, the 1992 assessed value,
and a set of hedonic characteristics of the homes contained in the Assessor’s database in
July 1994. The total number of property ownership transfers in the area of analysis is
larger than the database of this study. Many transactions are excluded from the database
because the Assessor’s Ofﬁce indicated that it believed that those transactions were not
reﬂective of market value. Additionally, the authors discovered approximately ﬁfty
transactions, not noticed as unusual by the Assessor’s Ofﬁce, that were clearly not
market-based sales. Reasons for exclusion of numerous transactions from the ﬁnal
database of this study include sales of partial interests, transfers between family members,
foreclosures and estate sales, and speculative home sales on high trafﬁc streets where the
property had a high probability of rezoning. The authors believe that the database of this
study consists solely of fair market sales of single-family homes but the authors also
recognize that the lack of perfect information in the real estate market may result in a
very small number of sales in the database that are not arm’s-length transactions.
The southern half of Bellingham includes the majority of the high-value homes in
Bellingham. As stated earlier, homes in Bellingham are reassessed every four years—the
homes in this half of the city were reassessed in 1992. While data were available on the
northern half of Bellingham, where homes were reassessed in 1993, an analysis of this
data is not included in this study. Therefore, this study’s data are a single consistent data
set where all the homes were assessed at the same time.
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The analysis of vertical equity begins with an examination of assessed value-to-sales price
(AV/SP) ratios. Exhibit 2 presents the AV/SP ratios for six different value categories of
home sales over a ﬁve-year period, 1990 to 1994. If vertical equity exists, one would
expect to see the same ratio for each value category. If inequity exists one would expect to
see the ratio decreasing, suggesting regressive inequity (or increasing, showing progres-
sive inequity), as the sales price rises. The assessments were made in spring 1992 (they
were mailed to residents by the County Assessor in mid-May). The sales prices are the
actual reported sales prices in each of the given years. Thus, only 1990 and 1991 sales
prices were known at the time of the assessment, plus some knowledge of early 1992 sales
prices.
The evidence from Exhibit 2 suggests that some regressive inequity exists. Looking at
the homes that were sold in 1990 and 1991, the AV/SP ratios in Panel A of Exhibit 2
decline steadily as the sales price rises. It is particularly striking that the homes that sold
for more than $400,000 had relatively low ratios. While the average home that sold in
1990 was assessed in 1992 at 93% of its 1990 sales price, the one home that sold for more
than $400,000 in 1990 was assessed in 1992 at only 61% of its sales price. Using 1991
data, the three homes that sold for more than $400,000 were assessed in 1992 at 78% of
their sales price, compared to an average AV/SP ratio of 87% for all homes.
222 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
VOLUME 14, NUMBER 3, 1997
Exhibit 2
Assessed Value/Sales Price Ratios by Year of Sale and Sales Price Category
(assessed values are for 1992)
Panel A: Number of Observations and Mean AV/SP by Year
Year of Sale 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Sales Price: N AV/SP N AV/SP N AV/SP N AV/SP N AV/SP
$400,000 and higher 1 .61 3 .78 3 .67 2 .61 6 .62
$250,000 to $399,999 14 .86 18 .86 28 .79 26 .73 17 .80
$150,000 to $249,999 47 .86 72 .86 75 .80 92 .80 50 .75
$125,000 to $149,999 35 .94 31 .87 42 .81 49 .76 23 .72
$100,000 to $124,999 34 .93 28 .87 36 .79 43 .77 21 .71
Less than $100,000 108 .98 80 .89 66 .85 50 .76 18 .76
Total 239 .93 232 .87 250 .81 262 .77 135 .75
Panel B: Percentage of Properties Sold Having an AV/SP Ratio of 0.80 or Higher
Year of Sale 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Sales Price:
$400,000 and higher 0 67 0 0 0
$250,000 to $399,999 71 72 46 23 47
$150,000 to $249,999 77 76 49 48 38
$125,000 to $149,999 89 77 57 37 35
$100,000 to $124,999 85 79 53 37 19
Less than $100,000 86 79 67 36 10
Average Percentage 84 77 55 39 30The 1992 through 1994 data also show very low assessment ratios for each year for the
$400,0001 category, compared to the average assessment ratio for all homes sold in each
year. Unlike the data for 1990 and 1991, the 1992–94 sales price data was not available to
assessors at the time of the 1992 assessment. Therefore, this data is merely an indicator of
how well the 1992 assessments reﬂect (or predict) future sales prices. The AV/SP ratios for
these years show that the typical assessed value for the $400,0001 category was only 61%
to 67% of the eventual selling price, compared to 71% to 85% for the lower-value
categories during these years. Thus, regressive inequity continued to exist in future years.
By 1994 the vertical inequity seems to be less than at the time of the assessments two
or three years earlier. Two categories of homes selling for more than $150,000 have higher
AV/SP ratios than two categories selling for less than $150,000. This can be explained by
differential price increases that occurred across the six sales price categories. Using the
methodology in Benson et al. (1998) a price index was constructed for each of three
different housing price categories for the 1990–94 period. The results showed that homes
in the over-$250,000 category increased in value by about 22%, homes in the $100,000 to
$250,000 category increased by 36%, and homes in the under-$100,000 category
increased by more than 63%. Therefore, the seeming reduction in vertical inequity by
1994 is due to somewhat anomalous market forces that caused low-to-medium-priced
homes to appreciate more rapidly.
Panel B of Exhibit 2 shows the percent of homes in each category that were assessed at
80% or more of the sales price. (It appears that assessments seem to be aiming for an
average assessment ratio of about 80% to 90% at the time the assessment takes place.)
While 50% (two of the four) of the $400,0001 homes that sold in 1990 and 1991 were
assessed at a rate above 80%, none of the houses in this category that sold in the 1992 to
1994 period had an assessment ratio above .80. In contrast, the average proportion of
properties assessed at 80% or higher of the actual sales price in 1990 and 1991 were 84%
and 77%, respectively. As sales prices continued to rise in the early 1990s, the assessment
ratios fell (Panel A shows they fell to an average of 74% in 1994), as would be expected if
assessments are unchanging; and the proportion of properties having assessment ratios of
greater than 80% fell as well (Panel B shows that only 30% of properties, on average, were
assessed at 80% or more of their actual 1994 sales price). The numbers in Panel B for the
low-priced homes sold from 1992 to 1994 reﬂect the fact that the lowest price homes had
the greatest price appreciation. For 1994 the proportion of lower-priced homes having
assessment ratios above .80 was only 19% and 10%, respectively, for the two lowest value
categories—a much lower percent than for the next three higher categories and the largest
change across all categories compared to the 1992 numbers.
The above analysis suggests that some regressive vertical inequity may exist,
particularly in the highest value category. While the number of sales in the $400,000-plus
category tended to be very low in each year examined—from one sale in 1990 to six sales
in 1994—the pattern across the ﬁve-year period is very consistent. There is no evidence
that high-value homes are overassessed and, therefore, no evidence of progressive
inequity. On the other hand, there is evidence that high-value homes were underassessed,
relative to moderate and lower-value homes during the period of the study.
Quantitative Models That Test Vertical Equity
While the examination of average assessment ratios across discrete value categories is
very revealing, it will be helpful to examine the question of vertical equity using
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those models that assume that the sales price (SP) of a home is the best estimate of the
true value (or market value) of a home. Therefore, the focus is on those models 
that use the assessed value (AV) or the assessment ratio (AV/SP) as the dependent
variable and the sales price as the independent (or explanatory) variable. In a well-
functioning environment assessed value should be a function of (or be determined by)
sales price.
Alternative models suggested by Kochin and Parks (1982) take the view that the
assessed value is an unbiased estimate of true value; and, therefore, they suggest that
assessed values should be used as the explanatory variable. The authors of this study
disagree with Kochin and Parks and argue that assessed values are not unbiased value
estimates. Among the reasons for possible inaccurate value estimates resulting from the
assessment process are:
• The information set of hedonic factors used by an assessor to determine home
value may leave out some important factors that homebuyers value, particularly
factors that may be important to upscale buyers, such as the view afforded by a
location, upgrades inside the house, or other amenities that add to quality, but
are difﬁcult to measure.
• There is a lack of homogeneity among high-value homes, plus there are few sales
upon which appraisers can base their judgments. Many of the amenities afforded
by high-value homes may be more difﬁcult to value because the amenity may be
very unique and its value is more a personal preference than a measurable
commodity. This could include special landscaping, an unusually attractive view,
expensive interior improvements such as a deluxe kitchen, tile ﬂoors, crown
mouldings, elegant bathrooms, and similar upgrades, a tennis court, or a unique
historical value due to the age and architecture of the home. Further, there may
be much greater disagreement among buyers and appraisers as to what value to
place on such amenities, and appraisers may tend to err on the low side because
of their inability to ﬁrmly defend the values on these amenities.
• An assessor’s ofﬁce may be underfunded to such an extent that the database used
to make assessments is incomplete and rather than doing physical inspections
they can only afford ‘‘drive-by’’ inspections of properties. Because high-value
homes tend to be more complex in the amenities they provide to the occupant (as
discussed above), an assessor’s ‘‘drive-by’’ inspection is likely to leave out more
factors for these homes. Also, these high-value homes are more likely to contain
improvements, not existing at the time of previous assessment because the owners
are more likely to be able to afford improvements.
• There may be very few sales at the high end of the market, making it difﬁcult to
justify wholesale revaluation of high-end properties based upon only a few
transactions.4
• The assessor may strive toward a relative undervaluation of high-value properties
to avoid challenges from this segment of the population due to limited resources
available to handle challenges. It may be more likely that the owner of an
$800,000 home will challenge an assessment that is at 90% of value, than would
the owner of a $100,000 home, because the owner of the more expensive home
has a lot more to gain if the challenge is successful.5
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model may not be able to capture the inequity. If only higher-valued properties are
systematically underassessed relative to other properties, the use of a model that explains
AV/SP using AV may indicate that this ratio does not change or even rises as AV rises,
suggesting neutral or progressive inequity, when some degree of regressivity actually
exists.
The models used in this study include those of the following three forms:
AV 5 a01a1SP ,
AV/SP 5 a01a1SP ,
AV 5 a01a1SP1a2LOW1a3 HIGH1a4 LOW * SP1a5 HIGH * SP,
where, LOW and HIGH are equal to ‘‘1’’ if home price levels are below or above that level
which one may expect to ﬁnd some degree of vertical inequity compared to the mid-range
of home prices. The models are estimated for each separate year of the ﬁve-year period
and for the period as a whole. When the models are estimated using data from all ﬁve
years, the sales prices are inﬂated or deﬂated to the second quarter 1992. The housing
price index series used for this was developed in Benson et al. (1999).6
The AV5a01a1 SP Model. This model may be speciﬁed in either linear or nonlinear
form. Paglin and Fogarty (1972) specify the variables in linear form. Using the linear
form, the estimates of a0 and a1 are shown in Panel A of Exhibit 3 for each period used
in this study. If vertical equity exists in the assessment process, each regression line would
originate from the origin and would have a slope coefﬁcient approximately equal to the
AV/SP ratio shown in Panel A of Exhibit 2. The positive (and signiﬁcant) intercept terms,
a0, in Panel A of Exhibit 3 suggest the presence of regressive vertical tax inequity. The
slope coefﬁcients, a1, show that assessed value goes up by about seventy-eight cents for
each dollar increase in sales price for the 1990 and 1991 home sales.
Because this study uses 1992 assessed values with ﬁve different years of home sales, the
estimates for the different years in Panel A of Exhibit 3 should be interpreted differently.
For 1990 and 1991 the sales prices were known by the Assessor’s Ofﬁce when the 1992
assessments were made. Some of the early 1992 sales prices were also known, but not the
majority of the 1992 sales. The 1993 and 1994 home sales occurred after the assessment.
Therefore, SP should be a better predictor of AV for 1990 and 1991 than for the later
years. The R-squared terms are, in fact, lower for 1993 and 1994 than for the earlier years.
The estimate of the slope coefﬁcient, a1, is also lower, the later the year of the home sale.
Thus, larger disparities between AV and SP are expected as one moves away from the
assessment year into the future. The 1990 and 1991 estimates are the truest picture of how
the County Assessor used the available data. The 1993 and 1994 estimates show how well
the future sales prices ‘‘conform’’ to the assessments already made.
A quadratic speciﬁcation, AV5a01a1 SP1a2 SP2, implies that the relationship
between  SP and  AV is not linear. Using this speciﬁcation, suggested by Bell (1984),
provides the estimates shown in Panel B of Exhibit 3. The r-square for each of these
annual regressions is higher than for the linear model, suggesting that the relationship
between AV and SP is not linear. In addition, the a2 coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly negative in
each case, conﬁrming the nonlinearity of the model and indicating that the rise in AV
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are higher R-square terms for the 1990 and 1991 estimates.
An alternative nonlinear speciﬁcation to that of the quadratic speciﬁcation is a log
speciﬁcation of the explanatory variable, AV5a01a1 (InSP). Using this model gives us
the estimates provided in Panel C of Exhibit 3. An examination of the r-square terms
suggests that the previous quadratic model is superior to this log speciﬁcation.
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Exhibit 3
Regression Estimates for the AV = a0 + a1 SP Models
Panel A: AV = a0 + a1 SP
Year of Sale a0 t-Stat. a1 t-Stat. R2 N
1990 14,992 6.00 0.7847 44.98 .8952 239
1991 11,473 4.55 0.7847 52.85 .9239 232
1992 10,765 3.74 0.7308 45.34 .8923 250
1993 12,813 4.09 0.6872 38.73 .8523 262
1994 14,742 2.97 0.6534 27.24 .8480 135
1990–1994 13,168 9.68 0.7352 92.22 .8840 1118
Panel B: AV = a0 + a1 SP + a2 SP 2
Year of Sale a0 t-Stat. a1 t-Stat. a2 t-Stat. R2
1990 1,782 0.40 0.9712 17.61 2531027 23.56 .9005
1991 211,273 23.14 1.0392 30.45 25.2331027 28.08 .9408
1992 21,975 20.43 0.8710 20.25 22.9431027 23.50 .8974
1993 216,471 23.10 0.9969 19.96 26.4931027 26.57 .8734
1994 225,391 23.23 1.0162 16.23 25.9731027 26.16 .8819
1990–1994 26,999 23.25 0.9613 46.26 24.7731027 211.67 .8966
Panel C: AV = a0 + a1 (lnSP)
Year of Sale a0 t-Stat. a1 t-Stat. R2
1990 21,121,831 229.79 106,324 32.84 .8198
1991 21,420.020 235.44 131,311 38.67 .8667
1992 21,280,244 229.54 118,694 32.48 .8097
1993 21,380,331 234.68 126,360 37.79 .8460
1994 21,572,766 223.44 142,219 25.45 .8296
1990–1994 21,326,093 267.44 122,787 73.80 .8299
Panel D: lnAV = a0 + a1 (lnSP)
Year of Sale a0 t-Stat. a1 t-Stat. R2
1990 1.5491 6.33 0.8595 40.82 .8755
1991 0.3607 1.65 0.9571 51.79 .9210
1992 0.6005 2.34 0.9306 42.99 .8817
1993 20.2420 20.75 0.9973 36.87 .8394
1994 0.0513 0.1334 0.9696 30.27 .8732
1990–1994 0.5567 4.51 0.9365 89.60 .8779A log-linear speciﬁcation, InAV5a01a1 (InSP), is suggested by Cheng (1974). This
model provides the estimates shown in Panel D of Exhibit 3. Regressive tax inequity is
suggested if the coefﬁcient, a1, is less than one and is statistically inequivalent to one. The
coefﬁcient, a1, is an elasticity coefﬁcient that estimates the percentage change in AV for a
given percentage change in SP. T-tests (not shown here) of the difference between a1 and
one indicate that all of the a1 coefﬁcients are signiﬁcantly lower than one, except for the
1993 coefﬁcient.
The AV/SP5a01a1 SP Model. Using AV/SP as the dependent variable, the model may
also be speciﬁed in either linear or nonlinear form. In linear form the model is referred to
as the IAAO (1978) model. When the variables are speciﬁed in linear form the estimates
of a0 and a1 are as shown in Panel A of Exhibit 4 for each year used in this study. The
signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcients for a1 for 1990, 1991, 1992, and for the entire period, 1990
through 1994, indicate the presence of regressive tax inequity. The r-square for each
regression is low because sales price alone does not provide a good explanation of why
AV/SP varies from one property to another.7 Sirmans et al. (1995) also had a very low r-
square using this model to analyze their Miami, Florida data.
A log speciﬁcation of the explanatory variables, AV/SP5a01a1 (InSP), provides the
estimates shown in Panel B of Exhibit 4. Looking at r-square, these results are somewhat
better than the linear model. Both the linear and the log model estimates have higher R-
square terms for the earlier years than for 1993 and 1994.
The Piecewise Spline Model. The piecewise spline model, proposed by Sunderman et al.
(1990) is of the form AV5a01a1 SP1a2 LOW1a3 HIGH1a4 LOW * SP1a5 HIGH * SP,
where:
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Exhibit 4
Regression Estimates for the AV/SP = a0 + a1 SP Models
Panel A: AV/SP = a0 + a1 SP
Year of Sale a0 t-Stat. a1 t-Stat. R2
1990 1.0358 47.44 28.1031027 25.31 .1063
1991 0.9072 58.97 22.3431027 22.58 .0281
1992 0.8608 45.76 23.0631027 22.90 .0328
1993 0.7915 42.61 21.2431027 21.18 .0053
1994 0.7621 32.97 21.1631027 21.04 .0080
1990–1994 0.8815 91.28 23.2431027 25.73 .0285
Panel B: AV/SP = a0 + a1 (lnSP)
Year of Sale a0 t-Stat. a1 t-Stat. R2
1990 2.5967 10.70 20.1431 26.86 .1657
1991 1.3649 7.40 20.0418 22.67 .0301
1992 1.6338 7.77 20.0693 23.91 .0580
1993 0.8393 3.62 20.0057 20.29 .0003
1994 1.0528 3.57 20.0260 21.06 .0083
1990–1994 1.6375 14.31 20.0682 27.04 .0425LOW is equal to one if the home’s sale price is less than the ﬁrst knot, otherwise
zero,
HIGH is equal to one if the home’s sale price is above the second knot,
otherwise zero,
LOW * SP is the home’s sale price if it is less than the ﬁrst knot, otherwise zero,
HIGH * SP is the home’s sale price if it is greater than the second knot,
otherwise zero.
The estimated LOW and HIGH ‘‘knots’’ that separate the low and high price ranges from
the middle price range are $100,000 and $249,999.8 The model estimates are given in
Exhibit 5. Vertical equity is measured with coefﬁcients a0, a2 and a3. The analysis will
focus on the 1990–94 estimates shown in the last row. A graphical presentation is
provided in Exhibit 6. The intercept term, a0 (or $1,527), indicates that there is no tax
inequity in the middle segment, since the term is insigniﬁcantly different from zero. The
intercept for the lower segment is $18,902, a01a2 (or $1,5271$17,375). This term is
signiﬁcantly different from zero, suggesting some regressive inequity in the lower
segment. The intercept for the upper segment is $82,322, a01a3 (or $1,5271$80,795).
This intercept is highly signiﬁcant, indicating the presence of regressive inequity in the
upper segment.
The slope of the middle segment is a1, the coefﬁcient for SP. For the 1990–94 estimates
this value is 0.82. The slope of the lower segment is 0.61, a11a4 (or 0.82–0.21). The slope
of the upper segment is 0.53, a11a5 (or 0.82–0.29). The slope of both the lower and upper
segments is signiﬁcantly less than is the slope of the middle segment, suggesting that the
relationship between assessed value and sales price is quite different for these segments
than it is for the middle segment that shows no vertical inequity. Exhibit 6 shows a graph
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Exhibit 5
Regression Estimates for the Piecewise Spline Model
(AV = a0 + a1 SP + a2 LOW + a3 HIGH + a4 LOW *SP + a5 HIGH*SP)
Year of Sale a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 R2
1990 15,499 0.7928 10,403 97,396 20.1815 20.3141 .9038
(t-Stat.) (2.22) (17.39) (0.95) (3.79) (21.51) (23.51)
1991 4.056 0.8382 11,347 100,506 20.1458 20.3094 .9398
(t-Stat.) (0.64) (21.64) (0.82) (7.05) (20.94) (25.85)
1992 24,197 0.8300 11,473 62,449 20.0805 20.2475 .9006
(t-Stat.) (20.64) (20.65) (0.78) (4.18) (20.48) (24.33)
1993 210,076 0.8529 14,834 84,454 20.1536 20.3720 .8757
(t-Stat.) (21.57) (21.06) (0.65) (5.00) (20.60) (26.02)
1994 213,219 0.8241 51,727 127,572 20.5353 20.4213 .8889
(t-Stat.) (21.20) (12.07) (1.36) (6.54) (21.26) (25.22)
1990–1994 1,527 0.8222 17,375 80,795 20.2089 20.2947 .8970
(t-Stat.) (0.47) (40.45) (2.35) (10.41) (22.49) (210.15)of the estimated function along with the plots for each of the properties in the sample.
The 45° line shows what assessed values would be if they were 100% of sales prices. The
plots in Exhibit 8 suggest a dramatic improvement in vertical equity compared to the
plots shown in Exhibit 7.
An examination of the annual regressions for the piecewise spline model indicates that
the intercept and slope coefﬁcients for the lower segment, a2 and a4, are not signiﬁcant.
However, the coefﬁcients for the upper segment, a3 and a5, are highly signiﬁcant for all
years. The intercept for the upper segment is higher than that for the middle segment in
all years, and the slope of the line is less. Thus, regressive inequity seems to be present in
the range of homes that have sold for $250,000 and up. As in the earlier models, the
estimates have higher R-square terms for the earlier years than for 1993 and 1994.
Summary and Recommendations
This study is a preliminary examination of the vertical equity of property tax assessments
of single-family homes in Bellingham, Washington. This market experienced dramatic
increases in home values during the 1987 to 1994 time period, and tax assessments rose
as well, since Washington State law requires periodic reassessments to reﬂect the recent,
higher values.
Utilizing a database of 1,118 home sales in the southern half of Bellingham during the
1990 to 1994 time period, various methodologies are employed to study vertical equity.
Uniform assessed value/market value (AV/MV) ratios across property value categories
would suggest vertical equity, while a propensity towards lower (higher) AV/MV ratios at
the upper end of the home market would suggest regressive (progressive) vertical inequity.
The results of this study suggest the presence of some regressive vertical inequity.
Regressive vertical inequity is particularly apparent for the $400,000 and above sales
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Sales Price (Inﬂation Adjusted using 1992/2 = 100)price category of homes as these homes are assessed at lower assessed value-to-sales price
(AV/SP) ratios than is the average home. The AV/SP ratios for the high-value homes are
consistently below the overall average for all homes. The actual number of homes sold in
this category is small, however, suggesting that further study is warranted.
The evidence indicates that some vertical inequity in property assessment may exist in
the Bellingham single-family home market. It is particularly evident at the upper end of
the market where AV/SP ratios are low, using 1992 assessed value and 1990–92 sales
prices. Given the already regressive tax structure at the state level in Washington, this
means that the overall tax structure for Washington residents may be even more
regressive than previously believed. A shift toward vertical equity could mean that more
tax revenues would be generated (from high-end homeowners) for local government; or,
if total tax revenues remain the same, a shift of the tax burden could be made away from
low-end and mid-price range homeowners to high-end homeowners. Some revisions in
assessment policies and techniques and/or an increase in the resources allocated to the
assessment process would likely be necessary for this to occur.
Notes
1This information was provided by Linda Lethlean in the Property Tax Division of the Washington
State Department of Revenue.
2Beginning in 1996 the State of Washington started a program that allows for the freezing of
taxable assessed valuation for seniors (61 years of age and up) whose income is less than $28,000.
This affects tax payments in 1997 and beyond.
3While the law says that county assessors must assess all properties for property tax purposes at
100% of market value, the problem faced by assessors is that it is against the law to have any
properties assessed at over 100%! Therefore, the real task faced by an assessor is to assess properties
at the highest possible level of uniformity that is close to 100%, without having any single property
over 100%. This is why the average assessment may be closer to, say, 90%.
4One employee of the Whatcom County Assessor’s Ofﬁce told the authors that some wealthy
individuals (especially those from California and Vancouver, B.C.) come to Bellingham and
“overpay” for properties. That person felt that the use of that sales price in determining assessed
value would not only unduly inﬂate the assessed value of that property, but also assessed values of
nearby residents.
5The Whatcom County Assessor’s Ofﬁce reports that a higher proportion of challenges to assessed
values is made by homeowners in the upper third of the home value spectrum.
6The housing price index series developed in Benson et al. (1999) is:
Price Index Price Index Price Index Price Index
Quarter (1984/1 = 100) (1992/2 = 100) Quarter (1984/1 = 100) (1992/2 = 100)
1984/1 1.000
1990/1 1.562 0.809 1992/2 1.929 1.000
1990/2 1.745 0.905 1992/3 2.029 1.052
1990/3 1.785 0.925 1992/4 2.015 1.044
1990/4 1.790 0.928 1993/1 2.007 1.040
1991/1 1.791 0.928 1993/2 2.149 1.114
1991/2 1.831 0.949 1993/3 2.130 1.104
1991/3 1.872 0.970 1993/4 2.193 1.137
1991/4 1.865 0.967 1994/1 2.183 1.131
1992/1 1.915 0.992 1994/2 2.257 1.170
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homes, rather we are looking at how AV/SP varies as SP rises. AV/SP may vary across homes due
to differences in ﬁnancing packages, costs of sale, marketing expenses, urgency of sale, inﬂated
buyer estimates of value, ﬂaws in the assessment process, etc.
8The knots were determined through observation of the data and by empirical analysis. Many other
values were tried but provided an inferior ﬁt for the model. Changes in these values by 5% to 10%
has only an insigniﬁcant impact on the model estimates. The knot values are unique to Bellingham
home sales for the period under observation.
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